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PROPOSED CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT
CONTRACT DISPUTES SETTLEMENT: THE
LEGISLATIVE BATTLE OVER THE
WUNDERLICH CASE
Franklin M. Schultz
AT least since the Civil War the United States' favorite device
for settling its differences with private contractors has been
the so-called finality or disputes clause. This clause, now stand-
ard "boiler-plate" in practically all supply and construction pro-
curement contracts, empowers the Government's representative,
the contracting officer, to settle all disputes arising under the
contract, such decision to be "final and conclusive," subject only
to an administrative review. Under the "all disputes" clause the
Government contracting officer decides questions of law and
fact I whereas the "fact disputes" clause leaves to his final de-
termination only questions of fact.2 The Court of Claims had
intimated in the past that the parties to the contract were not
competent to decide questions of law under an "all disputes"
clause, on the theory that a court could not be ousted of its juris-
diction to decide legal questions.8 Only after it was twice reversed
by the Supreme Court, once per curiam,4 and once by a unanimous
opinion in 1950 in United States v. Moorman,5 did the Court of
Claims recognize the validity of an "all disputes" clause.
* Member of the Ohio Bar. A.B. Yale, 1939, LL.B., 1942. This article was
written while the author was Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University Law
School.
' See James Graham Mfg. Co. v. United States, 91 F. Supp. 715, 716 n.1
(N.D. Cal. i95o).
2 Armed Services Procurement Regulation (hereinafter cited as ASPR)
§ 7-io3.12, i CCH Gov'T CoNTRAcs REP. [ 4,o6i (1947).
'See, e.g., Beuttas v. United States, 6o F. Supp. 771 (Ct. Cl. 1940), rev'd on
other grounds, 324 U.S. 768, 772 (i945); Braucher, Arbitration Under Government
Contracts, 17 LAw & CONTEMP. PaoB. 473, 489-91 (1952).
4 United States v. McShain, 308 U.S. 512, 520 (1939), reversing 88 Ct. Cl. 284
(1939).
s 338 U.S. 457. In Moorman the contractor, who had contracted to grade the
site of a proposed aircraft assembly plant, disagreed with the Government as to
the amount of land included under a contract which provided that both questions
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Although the contracting parties agree that the decision of the
contracting officer is final subject only to administrative review,
the courts have continuously made limited review available to a
contractor aggrieved by such a decision. They have refused to
rule that a contract providing for expert determination of disputes
ousted the court's jurisdiction to decide whether the expert ex-
ercised his power of determination honestly, as contemplated by
the contract. After Mr. Justice Harlan announced the opinion
in Kiklberg v. United States 6 in 1878, the Court generally took
the position that a Government officer, contractually empowered
to decide disputes, occupied the position of an impartial third-
party expert in whom both parties had placed confidence and
whose considered judgment must not be supplanted by judge or
jury unless it involved "fraud or such gross mistake as would
necessarily imply bad faith, or failure to exercise an honest judg-
ment .. . ." ' That the Court may have believed that this lan-
guage was more than mere verbalism is seen by its disposal of a
similar contract dispute between private parties. In reversing the
trial judge who had instructed the jury in terms of "fraud or
gross mistake," rather than "such gross mistake as necessarily
implied bad faith," the Court maintained that the parties are
presumed to have in mind the possibility that the arbiter might
err in his determination of such matters and put their faith in
his expertness.' Nevertheless both the Supreme Court and the
of fact and contract requirements should be finally decided by the contracting
officer. The contractor entered a claim for additional compensation and appealed
the adverse decision of the contracting officer to the Court of Claims, which
upheld the claim on the basis that the contracting officer's decision was conclusive
only on questions of fact and that the dispute involved questions of law which
were for the court to decide. The Supreme Court, holding that the Court of Claims
should not have reconsidered the questions, recognized the right of the parties
to contract for administrative determination of contract requirements, even if such
determination involved questions of law.
6 97 U.S. 398.
7 Id. at 402.
8 Martinsburg & P.R.R. v. March, 114 U.S. 549, 553-54 (1884). In the
Martinsburg case, as in all cases down to the recent United States v. Wunderlich,
342 U.S. 98 ([951), the Supreme Court perceived (or at least, articulated) no
difference between private and Government contracts, nor between an independent
third-party arbiter appointed by the mutual consent of the parties and the Gov-
ernment's contracting officer selected by the Government and saddled with the
dual responsibility of representing the Government and judging disputes to which
it is a party. For a collection of the federal cases, see 94 L. Ed. 261 (1949); 96
L. Ed. x18 (ig5). See also Anderson, The Disputes Article in Government Con-
tracts, 44 M:/IcH. L. ,Ev. 211 (1945).
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Court of Claims had trouble fitting difficult cases into this for-
mula.' The I95I Supreme Court decision in United States v.
Wunderlich apparently further narrowed judicial review of a
contracting officer's final decision to a single ground, allegation
and proof of actual fraud, that is, "conscious wrongdoing, an
intention to cheat or be dishonest." " This new limitation on
judicial review of Government contract settlement, which set off
a reaction in legislative, administrative, and private circles, has
led to a general re-evaluation of the disputes clause machinery.
An understanding of the resulting proposals calls for a short
excursion into the nature and use of the Government contract
and, more particularly, the disputes clause itself.
I. THE GOVERNMENT'S CONTRACTING POSITION: BASIS FOR
THE DISPUTES CLAUSE
Certainly, in an ever-growing world of specialized contracts,
the Government contract stretches ordinary contract notions to
the breaking point. Underlying the liberal treatment of the Gov-
ernment as a contracting party by the courts is the doctrine of
sovereign immunity, which limits the contractor's legal remedy to
such forums as the Government chooses. Before 1855 Congress
was the exclusive forum; the Court of Claims, and the district
' See Needles v. United States, roi Ct. CI. 535, 604 (1944): "the court may
review an administrative decision when all the substantial evidence and relevant
data known to the officer and normally considered in arriving at such a decision
are against it. Under such facts the decision would be so grossly erroneous as to
justify the inference of bias or bad faith." This test was first formulated by
Judge Madden, concurring in Bein v. United States, ioi Ct. CI. 144, 167 (1943).
For a full analysis of the Court of Claims' verbal difficulties with the Kihlberg
formula, see Braucher, supra note 3, at 494-99.
In the 7o years since Kilberg, the Supreme Court has indulged in a bit of
meandering itself. See Ripley v. United States, 223 U.S. 695, 7oi-o2 (1912)
("duty that agent's judgment should be exercised, not capriciously or fraudulently,
but reasonably and with due regard to the rights of both the contracting parties").
10342 U.S. 98, 100 (ig5i). For proof that the Court of Claims has taken
the Wunderlich fraud rule to heart, see Palace Corp. v. United States, rio F. Supp.
476, 478 (Ct. Cl. 1953): "The Supreme Court in construing the standard form of
Article i has now limited the scope of review of decisions of heads of departments
to cases in which positive fraud is alleged and proved. No fraud is alleged in this
case. It would be a sheer waste of time and energies of the court and the
litigants to hear evidence beyond the limits of the blueprint clearly drawn by the
highest judicial authority."
A pending case in which the contractor is alleging actual fraud is A/S Jason v.
United States, No. A-i59-I 3 3 , S.D.N.Y.
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courts with limited concurrent jurisdiction," along with the Gen-
eral Accounting Office, 2 are relatively recent additions. Although
the Fifth Amendment precludes the Government from eliminat-
ing a private contract right, absent some paramount constitutional
power, it is clear that Congress may, at will, pare down or elimi-
nate any of these remedies.' Perhaps because of this and be-
cause the nature of Government is not "private," the Govern-
ment, as a contractor, has insisted on and received favorable
treatment in its contracting capacity which it would not receive
under ordinary principles of private contract law. Thus, although
the United States, like General Motors or United States Steel, must
operate through its agents and subagents, at the present those
agents cannot bind the Government beyond their actual authority.
The expansible doctrines of "apparent authority," "estoppel," and
"reformation" are unavailable to the contractor who has the mis-
fortune to deal with a mistaken or negligent agent.' 4  On the
" The Act of T855, To STAT. 612, establishing the Court of Claims to hear
claims against the United States, required congressional review of the decisions,
and not until a subsequent amendment in 1863, 12 STAT. 765, abolishing con-
gressional review and allowing an appeal to the Supreme Court, did the Court
of Claims assume its present judicial function. For a review of its early history,
see RICHARDSON, HISTORY, JURISDICTION, AND PRACTICE OF THE COURT OF CISdrS
OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1885).
These early statutes were superseded in 1887 by the Tucker Act, permitting
the United States to be sued in the Court of Claims in any amount and in the
United States district courts in an amount not in excess of $io,ooo in actions
based "upon any contract, expressed or implied, with the Government of the United
States, or for damages, liquidated or unliquidated, in cases not sounding in tort."
24 STAT. 5o5 (1887). The statute has since been incorporated in 28 U.S.C. § 1491
(Court'of Claims), § 1346 (district courts) (Supp. 1952).
12 The Comptroller General bases his power to determine the Government's
contract liability on § 305 of the Budget and Accounting Act, 42 STAT. 23 (1921),
31 U.S.C. § 71 (1946), which provides that "all claims" against the Government
"shall be settled and adjusted in the General Accounting Office." The 1921 act
abolished the office of Comptroller of the Treasury, an official who, since I868,
had been empowered to determine conclusively what balances remained in the
Treasury for use by each of the executive departments. For a general treatment
of the position of the Comptroller General, see MiuqsFIEn, Tim CoMPTRoLLE
GENERAL (1939).11 Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934).
4 See KESSLER AND SHARP, CONTRACTS, CASES AM% MATERIAS 780, 788 and
passim (I953). For comment on the proposed "Good Faith Reliance Act" see
Newman, Should Oficial Advice Be Reliable? -Proposals as to Estoppel and
Related Doctrines in Administrative Law, 53 COL. L. REV. 374 (1953). Perhaps
the harshest recent example of the Supreme Court's adherence to Holmes' "square
corners" approach was Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947)(5-4 decision).
[Vol. 6 7
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other hand the courts freely allow the Government the privilege
of insisting on firm offers without consideration, 15 the power to
insist on requirements as to writing covering more contracts than
the Statute of Frauds, 6 the right to make agreements exempt
from the statute of limitations,' 7 and the unlimited option to
terminate contracts for the convenience of the Government.' 8
Another peculiarity is that the Government in some of its op-
erations unavoidably assumes the role of the monopolist with
power for both legal and economic coercion. To cite one recent
legal example, the Selective Service Act of 1948 permits seizure
of the facilities of a manufacturer who refuses or fails to comply
with a mandatory order placed for the delivery of goods for the
armed services. 9 The possibility of economic coercion arises
during full-scale mobilization when the Government, through a
system of priorities, becomes the sole buyer of a particular com-
modity. Similarly, in negotiating its contracts, the Government,
as draftsman, uses standard forms which dictate the general con-
ditions of performance, including the disputes clause. A bidder
Is A recent example is Refining Associates, Inc. v. United States, 109 F. Supp. 259
(Ct. Cl. 1953), holding that a bidder could not withdraw its bid after the opening
but before the award where the bidder had agreed to keep the bid open for i5 days
after the opening. Interestingly enough, the Court of Claims accepted the in-
corporation of a provision prohibiting withdrawal without questioning the absence
of consideration.
'OThe statutory signed writing requirement was eliminated by 65 STAT. 7O
(ig5i), but Army regulations continue to require writings. See, e.g., ASPR § 1-201.6,
i CCH Gov'T COXTRACrS REP. f[ X9,102 (1953): "All purchase transactions made
by a Contracting Officer will be evidenced by written contracts ... on approved
contract forms .... " See Note, 27 IND. L.J. 279 (r952).1 7 United States v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry., 118 U.S. 12o (I885).
18 See ASPR §§ 8-700 et seq., 2 CCH Gov'T CONTRACTS REP. ff 41, 86o (1953).
This right to terminate was first recognized in United States v. Corliss Steam-
Engine Co., 91 U.S. 321 (1875).
19 62 STAT. 625 (1948), 5o U.S.C. App. § 468 (Supp. 1952). This may be in-
voked "whenever the President after consultation with and receiving advice from
the National Security Resources Board determines that it is in the interest of the
national security for the Government to obtain prompt delivery of any articles
or materials the procurement of which has been authorized by the Congress ex-
clusively for the use of the armed forces of the United States, or for use of the
Atomic Energy Commission .... " For the Government's power to conscript in-
dustry during World War 1l, see War Labor Disputes Act, 57 STAT. 163 (i943),
the constitutionality of which was supported in the Montgomery Ward litigation.
United States v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 58 F. Supp. 408 (N.D. Ill.), cert. denied,
324 U.S. 858, rev'd, x5o F.2d 369 (7 th Cir.), vacated, 326 U.S. 690 (i945).
The Defense Production Act of ig5o, 64 STAT. 799, as amended, 5o U.S.C. App.
§ 2o81 (Supp. 1952), also gives the President broad powers to requisition equip-
ment and supplies for the national defense upon payment of just compensation.
1953]
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who sought to eliminate the disputes clause would no doubt be
disqualified; a procurement officer who eliminated it would not
bind his department."
Perhaps Mr. Justice Douglas had this unbalanced picture in
mind when he dissented in Wunderlich. He speaks of the con-
tracting officer as a potential tyrant with "the power of life
and death over a private business even though his decision is
grossly erroneous. Power granted is seldom neglected . . . . The
rule we announce makes Government oppressive." 21 Presumably
Mr. Justice Douglas envisioned the case of the small, helpless,
dependent businessman whose very livelihood is subject to the
whims of some capricious Government "bureaucrat" -a case of
David against Goliath.
This is one side of the coin. The picture on the other side is
sketched by Mr. Justice Minton for the majority in Wunderlich:
Respondents [the dam contractors] were not compelled or coerced into
making the contract. It was a voluntary undertaking on their part.
2o For a contrary view on the dominant role of the Government as contractor,
see Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
315 U.S. 289, 336 (1942): "During wartime the bargaining position of Government
contracting officers is inherently weak, no matter how conscientious they may
be . . . . It is not difficult in these days to appreciate the position of negotiators
for the Government in time of war and to realize how much the pressures of war
deprive them of equality of bargaining power in situations where bargaining with
private contractors is the only practicable means of securing-war supplies . .. "
It has also been argued that, while standardized, the Government contract is by
no means one-sided, because so much of the normal financial risk has been taken
out of it. Escalator and price redetermination clauses present one facet of this
point of view; the Contract Settlement and War Hardship Acts represent another.
For an instructive analysis of World War 1H procurement in these terms, see Fain
and Watt, War Procurement-A New Pattern in Contracts, 44 COL. L. REv. 127
(1944). Financial underwriting of both large and small contractors, even to the
point of bailing them out of impending bankruptcy, is still another index of the
reduced risk in contracting with the Government. For a Korean War case study,
see Cary, Government Financing of Essential Contractors: The Reorganization of
the Glenn L. Martin Co., 66 HARV. L. Rav. 834 (X953).
21 342 U.S. 98, 101-02 ('95'). Mr. Justice Reed joined in this dissent. Mr.
justice Douglas' views were foreshadowed by his dissent in United States v. Holpuch
Co., 328 U.S. 234, 243 (1946), pointing out the unfairness in holding a contractor to a
literal reading of the contract. See also his opinion for the Court in Priebe & Sons
v. United States, 332 U.S. 407 (1947), refusing to permit the Government to use
a liquidated damage clause as an in terrorem remedy to expedite the lend-lease
program. He also joined in Mr. Justice Jackson's pungent dissent in Federal Crop
Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 386 (1947). Mr. Justice Jackson dissented
from the Wunderlich opinion on the ground that it narrowed the Court's tradi-
tional test by eliminating the alternative of "such gross mistake as necessarily
implied bad faith." 342 U.S. at 102 (1951).
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As competent parties they have contracted for the settlement of disputes
in an arbitral manner . . . . The limitation upon this arbitral process
is fraud, placed there by this Court. If the standard of fraud that we
adhere to is too limited that is a matter for Congress.2 2
Apparently, Mr. Justice Minton had the notion that the con-
tracts involved were made as a result of arm's length bargaining.
To extrapolate somewhat freely, his mental image is of a contractor
operating vis-a-vis the Government in a balanced market, one
who can take the Government's business or leave it alone. It is
of a contractor well-advised by competent counsel concerning
the bite of the finality clause who should, perhaps, be expected
to include in his bid the appropriate cost of potential arbitrary
and capricious conduct on the part of the contracting officer.3
In fact, in the Wunderlich case the Government argued that "in an
effort to avoid expensive and time-consuming litigation of techni-
cal factual disputes, the Government bargains and pays for in-
clusion of Article i5 in its standard construction contract." 24 No
one, of course, has made a field study to determine whether the
contractor translates the potential arbitrariness of the contracting
officer into a cost item in the various types of cost and lump-sum
contracts utilized in the Government's mammoth procurement
program. Nor has anyone explored the related question of the
relative bargaining power of the "average" prime contractors vis-
a-vis the Government.
While a unique form of economic power as employed by the
Government, the disputes clause is actually a development from
similar settlement provisions in private contracts. The Standard
Form of Arbitration Procedure of the American Institute of Archi-
tects calls for submission of disputes to one or three arbitrators
22 342 U.S. 98, zoo (1951).
23 It is perhaps reminiscent of Wells Bros. Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 83,
87 (1920): "Men who take million dollar contracts for Government buildings are
neither unsophisticated nor careless. Inexperience and inattention are more likely
to be found in other parties to such contracts than the contractors, and the pre-
sumption is obvious and strong that the men signing such a contract as we have
here protected themselves against such delays as are complained of by the higher
price exacted for the work."
24 Government's Petition for Certiorari, p. 14; see also Brief for the United
States, p. 16: "Like every other provision of a Government contract, it is an
element which doubtless affects the contract price. If the provision be deemed
advantageous to the Government, the advantage has been bought and paid for and
is entitled to as much effect as other agreements to arbitrate differences ... 11
:1953]
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
appointed by the parties.2 While a decision after a hearing is final,
this procedure differs from the Government disputes mechanism
in that the arbitrator with the decisive voice is not in the pay of
one of the parties.
Perhaps more closely analogous to the Government disputes
clause are those private contracts which make the supervising
expert the sole arbiter rather than provide for full-fledged arbitra-
tion of the AIA variety. Despite the fact that the expert is one
who has supervised the performance out of which the dispute
arises and is in the pay of the owner, Corbin concludes that the
decision of the hired expert is given as great weight in the courts
as the award of a disinterested arbitration panel.26 But there is
one vital difference in the case of a Government contract which
the courts fail to recognize: while the architect or engineer who
judges a dispute between his client, the owner, and the contractor
acts in a professional, quasi-judicial capacity, the non-licensed con-
tracting officer is not subject to professional standards or disci-
pline when he decides disputes between his principal, the Govern-
ment, and the contractor.2 7
II. ADMINISTRATrw REvIEW
A. Function of the ASBCA
Recently, the Government has answered this implied charge
of unfairness by pointing to the contractual departmental review
provided by its boards of contract appeals as surrogates for in-
dependent third-party judgment. In most contracting agencies
review by the department head has, since World War II, been
formalized by delegation to a "duly authorized representative,"
namely, a board of contract appeals, which provides the aggrieved
25 Art. 39, The General Conditions of the Contract for the Construction of
Buildings, Am!R1CAx INSTITUTE Or ARcmmcis, HANDBOOx or AacmTEcTuaAL
PRAcTIcE 169-7, (6th ed. I95i) (AIA Doc. No. 305).
203 CORBm, CONTRACTS § 652 (1951).
"The contracting officer is a ubiquitous character. He may be a Reserve or
Regular Army officer, or a civilian governmental employee. His background may
be engineering, business, or nothing even slightly related to the contract in question.
One contracting officer has described his job as a combination of "accountant-
auditor-engineer-business man." In the Air Force there are currently three types
of contracting officers: Procurement (negotiates the contract), Termination
(handles "termination for the convenience of the Government"), and Administra-




contractor, in the language of the broader disputes clause, the
"opportunity to be heard and offer evidence in support of its
appeal." 2 At present, the armed services, the Corps of Engi-
neers, the General Services Administration, the Atomic En-
ergy Commission, and the Commodity Credit Corporation operate
such boards, while the Departments of Interior and Commerce,
which also carry on large procurement programs, do not.29 The
oldest of these boards, the Defense Department's Armed Services
Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA), provides a de novo review
of the contracting officer's decision. The officer's "findings of fact
are not evidence in refutation of sworn testimony"; o "they are
more like pleadings .... Y)31
The ASBCA, which is composed of fifteen members appointed
by the department secretaries, is divided into three panels: the
Army Contract Appeals Panel with nine members (further di-
vided into three divisions), the Navy Contract Appeals Panel
with three members, and the Air Force Contract Appeals Panel
with three members. Each member is an experienced lawyer;
none has served in a defense agency in any procurement capacity.
Each appeal is heard by one member of the appropriate panel or
division. The contractor may appear in person or be represented
by counsel. The actual hearing has recently been described by
a Board member in these terms:
The parties may offer at the hearing such evidence or arguments as they
deem appropriate subject, however, to the exercise of reasonable discre-
tion by the presiding member in supervising the extent and manner of
presentation. Evidence other than that ordinarily admissible under the
28 For the Defense Department's present disputes clause, see note 63 infra.
29 For descriptions of the various boards' operations and rules of procedure,
annotated, see i CCH Gov'T CoNcTArs REP. f 10,721 (I95') (ASBCA); i id.
[ io,751 (i95I) (General Services Administration Board of Review); z id.
io,76i (i95I) (Atomic Energy Commission Advisory Board of Contract Ap-
peals); I id. I[ IO,77i (i9si) (Contracts Disputes Board for Commodity Credit
Corporation); 2 id. 9 24,804 (195) (Corps of Engineers Claims and Appeals
Board, from which appeal lies to the ASBCA on all military contracts).
ao Kirk, BCA No. i, i Contract Cas., Fed. 168 (1943), cited in AusTnN, DIGEST OF
DECISIONS or TrE Aiuy BOARD OF CoNTRAcr APPEALS, x942-50 206 (igi).
"' Settergren, BCA Nos. 164, 218, i Contract Cas., Fed. 871 (i943), AusrnT, op.
cit. supra note 3o, at 2o6. Compare i CCH Gov'T CoNtrAcrs REP. ff IO,76I, § 3.22
(195): "Scope of the Proceedings. At a hearing the Board shall receive evidence
and arguments presented by or on behalf of the parties. The appeal will be consid-
ered de novo and independent findings of fact will be made, although the findings
of fact of the contracting officer may be adopted by the Board in whole or in part."
19531
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generally accepted rules of evidence may be received in evidence at the
discretion of the presiding member. The degree of formality of the hear-
ing depends upon the circumstances of the particular appeal . . . . On
a few occasions contractors have been more interested in getting some-
thing off their chests, as they put it, than in the final results of their ap-
peals. The presiding member, sensing such a situation, is generally lib-
eral in his rulings. On the other hand, if the issues are important or the
parties are represented by counsel, the hearing will be very much like a
court trial without a jury.32
The testimony and argument are recorded verbatim and the
parties have the right to file briefs. The presiding member drafts
a decision which is submitted to the other members of his panel
for approval. When a majority of the panel approves, the decision
becomes the decision of the panel and Board, provided that all
three panel chairmen agree that a review by the full Board is not
required. If a majority of the panel members cannot agree, or if
one or more panel chairmen do not waive review by the full
Board, the decision is then made by a majority of the members
of the full Board. Either party may move for a reconsideration.
The decisions are made in writing, and are available for public
inspection at the office of the Board in the Pentagon, but are not
officially published. Several unofficial digests are available.83
The use of the administrative review varies with the type of
clause involved. Where the "all disputes" clause is inserted in
the contract, the contractor must first exhaust his administrative
remedies before bringing a court action. In case of the more widely
used "fact disputes" clause the contractor must also take his
administrative appeal on fact questions but is free to seek dam-
ages immediately on issues of law in the General Accounting Office,
the Court of Claims, or a district court, in so far as the latter has
concurrent jurisdiction. Yet, because of the elusive distinction
between fact and law which the cases reflect, it is wise for a con-
tractor to take his administrative appeal lest he be thrown out of
2 Cuneo, Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals: Tyrant or Impartial
Tribunal?, 39 A.B.A.J. 373, 435 (1953). Information about the operation of the
ASBCA was obtained from Mr. Cuneo's article and a personal interview with
him in Washington in August 1953. Mr. Cuneo has been a member of the .4SBCA
and its predecessors since 1946. See also Austin, President of ASBCA, testifying,
Hearings before Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on
S. 2487, 82d Cong., sd Sess. 93-95 (I952).
a3 Cuneo, supra note 32.
[Vol. 67
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court for having failed to exhaust his administrative remedy on
what turns out to be an issue of fact.3 4
The Defense Department quickly recognized that the ASBCA
could not consider questions of fact under a fact disputes clause
without dealing with questions of law. Consequently, the ASBCA
charter empowers the Board, in its discretion, to "hear, consider,
and decide all questions of law necessary for the complete ad-
judication of the issue." 11 However, reversal of the contracting
officer's decisions on a question of law in such a case is not binding
on the GAO or the Court of Claims.38
It is doubtful whether an ASBCA proceeding approximates the
formality of an agency hearing subject to full Administrative
Procedure Act requirements. A Board member does not have
all the hearing powers called for by Section 7 of the APA.
For example, while he may cause depositions to be taken, he is
without authority to subpoena a witness.37 The APA evidence
requirements are not met; nor do the parties have a reason-
able opportunity to submit proposed findings and conclusions or
exceptions to decisions or recommended decisions.3 8 In recogni-
tion of this disparity between informal board procedures and
APA minimum requirements, several boards have explicitly dis-
claimed the applicability of the APA to their proceedings.89
"
4 See United States v. Blair, 32X U.S. 730, 734 (1944); Kennedy, The Con-
clusiveness of Administrative Findings in Disputes Arising under Government
Contracts, 4 BAYLOR L. Rav. I6o, I66 (1952).
3 32 CODE FED. REGS. following § 413.008 (195i). It continues: "Unless the
contract provides otherwise, when in the consideration of an appeal it appears
that a claim for unliquidated damages is involved therein, the Board shall, insofar
as the evidence permits, make findings of fact with respect to such claims without
expressing an opinion on the questions of liability." For a full discussion of the
ASBCA's authority and jurisdiction, see Etheridge, Appeals from Administrative
becisions in Government Contract Disputes, 31 TEXAS L. Ray. 552 (i953).
Questions of rescission or reformation of a contract, quantum neruit and quasi-
contract are all outside the Board's jurisdiction. Id. at 557.
25 Bell Aircraft Corp. v. United States, ioo F. Supp. 661, 696-99 (Ct. CI. zg5i),
aff'd by an equally divided Court, 344 U.S. 86o (1952), where the Court of Claims
discussed the Board's treatment of questions of law under a fact disputes clanse
but gave it no weight and decided the case the other way.
37 See Smith, The War Department Board of Contract Appeals, S Fao. BJ. 74,
79 (i943).
38 See 6o STAT. 241, 242, 5 U.S.C. §§ ioo6-o7 (1946).
39 See I CCH Gov'T CoNTRAcrs REP. 9I 10,771, § 4 00.1(f) (Ig5r), which provides
that "The provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act ... are not applicable
to proceedings before the Board [the Contracts Disputes Board of the Com-
modity Credit Corporation] except those requirements [of Section 3 on public
information]... .The Board does not issue opinions." See Clifton, BCA
1953]
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It is equally clear that the ASBCA proceedings fall far short
of a court trial, as afforded, for instance, by the Court of Claims
under its new rules.4 The Court of Claims' commissioner system
provides the full panoply of pleading, proof, and argument pro-
vided in a federal district court; in contrast, the ASBCA stresses
informal adjudication. Unlike judges, the Board members are
not appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate
nor granted security of tenure.
What of the analogy to a submission to arbitration? Again,
as in the case of the contracting officer, the basic difference is
that the contractor has no voice in the appointment of the Board,
which is the "secretary's duly authorized representative." The
Defense Department's fact disputes clause provides in the dis-
junctive for a decision by "the Secretary or his duly authorized
representative for hearing of such appeal." It has been con-
tended by individual board members that the Board is independ-
ent of the Defense Secretary's control, and that no decision is
ever subject to review at Department head level:
The Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force do not interfere with
the preparation of decisions. The Board at no time communicates with
the Secretaries or their staffs as to how an appeal should be decided.
The Board is above and apart from the procuring activities. In the
performance of their duties the Board members never see a contracting
officer except when one testifies at a hearing.41
Be that as it may, no contractor is likely to have the confidence
in a Board member that he would have in an arbitrator he had a
No. 1201, Austin, op. cit. supra note 30, at 5, where the ASBCA held that the APA
was not applicable as to the time for taking an appeal. Compare i CCH Gov'r
CONTRACTS REP. ff 1O,761, § 3.23 (x95i): "Conduct of hearings.-The hearings be-
fore the [AEC] Board will be informal, with no fixed form of procedure, and the
manner in which facts are found and conclusions reached shall be a matter for the
discretion of the Board .. . ." It should also be noted that the Administrative
Procedure Act, 6o STAT. 237 (1946), as amended, g U.S.C. § iooi(a) (1952),
specifically excludes functions conferred by the Contract Settlement Act of 1944,
parts of which are subject to ASBCA jurisdiction under its charter. See Cuneo,
supra note 32, at 376.
"0 Rules of the United States Court of Claims (revised Oct. 15, 1953). See
Smith, supra note 37, at 82: "The Board is not a judicial body, but an administrative
one. Though there is a degree of formality in the proceedings before the Board,
they are really informal as compared to court procedure, and strict rules of evi-
dence are not usually observed."
4 Cuneo, supra note 32, at 436.
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hand in selecting, particularly where the member is on the payroll
of the service against which he is prosecuting his claim. Appoint-
ment by the Secretary of Defense rather than the secretary of the
particular service would make for greater independence and con-
fidence.42
So much for the merits of the review provided the aggrieved
contractor by the administrative boards of contract appeal. It
should be noted that some department heads may provide only for
an administrative appeal to the Secretary, himself, as was the case
in Wunderlich.4"
In considering the finality of an architect's, engineer's, or
supervising expert's decision under a private contract disputes
clause, Corbin notes that the decision is equally conclusive against
the expert's own employer.44  This point was clearly made in
Kihlberg as to finality against the Government,4 5 and has been
followed, without deviation, by the Supreme Court as well as the
Court of Claims. Despite the fact that recent forms of the dis-
putes clause provide for an appeal by the contractor and thus a
second de novo administrative determination by the department
head or his representative board, the Government has never been
permitted to reopen the contracting officer's unfavorable decision
on a collateral matter at this level.46 As the Justice Department's
representative pointed out in the hearing on the McCarran Bill
(S. 24), the disputes clause is a one-way street, with administra-
42 See letter from 0. P. Easterwood, Jr., Hearings, supra note 32, at 120.
4 See Gaskins testifying in Hearings, supra note 32, at 3S:
I would like to make one further statement with respect to Mr. Phillips' testi-
mony. He told of the very thorough quasi-judicial review which is afforded by the
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals.
Well, it so happens that the War Department is responsible for letting only a
portion of the contracts in which the United States is interested, and a very ma-
terial part of all of the contracts are let by the Bureau of Reclamation, having to
do with many of the big dams out West, the power projects, and things of that
character.
Now that, of course, is under the Department of Interior. And the Department
of Interior has no formalized procedure for the hearing of appeals from decisions
of the contracting officer.
You may write a letter to the Department of the Interior, and they will consider
the appeal on the basis of your letter. If you want to talk to them personally, they
will assign a lawyer in the Solicitor's Office to listen to what you have to say. But
the various steps described by Mr. Phillips do not exist as regards many of the
departments which are now engaged in letting Government contracts.
A similar procedure is apparently followed by the Department of Commerce.
443 CORB3N, CONTRACTS § 652 (1951).
'I Kihlberg v. United States, 97 U.S. 398, 402 (1878).
11 See Bell Aircraft Corp. v. United States, ioo F. Supp. 66I, 691 (Ct. C1. i95i)
,
aff'd by an equally divided Court, 344 U.S. 86o (1952).
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tive appeal from the contracting officer's decision open to the con-
tractors, but not the Government.
So that if 20 disputes involving questions of fact arise and are decided
by the contracting officer during performance of a contract and the
contractor seems unduly advantaged by the decision of two such disputes,
but the Government appears to have been favored in the decision of two
others, only the latter two rulings will be appealed and if found to be
erroneous, will be corrected.4 7
Thus taken in conjunction with the present finality of the con-
tracting officer's decision vis-a-vis the Government, the depart-
ment's administrative review may be as favorable to the contractor
as comparable administrative and judicial reviews in, for instance,
tax disputes, where the Government's power to withdraw conces-
sions made to the taxpayer by any lower echelon administrative
officer is reserved. 8
B. The Place of the General Accounting Office
By Section 305 of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921,
Congress provided that claims by and against the United States
shall be settled and adjusted in the General Accounting Office."
The GAO, while not a party to the contract, may enter the picture
whenever vouchers are presented to it by an administrative agency
for "direct settlement" with a contractor, or whenever a disburs-
ing officer or head of an administrative agency requests an ad-
vance decision. The GAO also enters the picture when a con-
tractor makes a claim against the United States where payment
has been denied. It can deny payment or demand payment back;
if the latter is refused, it can collect directly from any other gov-
ernmental funds that may be due a contractor, and failing that
method, it may request that the Attorney General sue on behalf
17 Testimony of Phillips, Hearings, supra note 32, at 16.
1s Any concession made by an administrative officer of the Internal Revenue
Service may be withdrawn at any stage of the administrative proceeding (but note
the emerging policy to make such administrative concessions more conclusive, Int.
Rev. Mimeo. No. 298, Oct. 9, 1953, 4 P-H 1953 FE. TAX SSRv. 76,703). In fact,
even after issue is joined in a Tax Court proceeding to review a deficiency formally
asserted by the Commissioner, the Commissioner retains the power until the date
of hearing or rehearing in the court to claim any additional deficiency. INr. REv.
CODE § 272(e). Actually there is no formal administrative mechanism barring a
Government tax claim open under the statute of limitations except a closing agree-
ment signed by the Secretary of the Treasury, the Under-Secretary, or an Assistant
Secretary. INT. Rav. CODE § 3760.
'9 See note 12 supra.
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of the United States in the appropriate court. 50 It can also pay
claims denied by the contracting agency, and a contractor dissatis-
fied with a decision of a contracting officer or board of contract
appeals has a second opportunity for administrative review. Un-
like the departmental review, however, this GAO review is op-
tional and is not a prerequisite to filing a court action.5
The GAO has retained its authority to review the disbursement
of money by the contracting officer in spite of the finality clause,
but, like the courts, had prior to Wunderlich found itself limited
to finding fraud or gross error implying fraud.52 While recogniz-
ing the hardship the finality clause may work on the private
contractor in those cases where the contracting officer has erred
in favor of the Government, the GAO, as the Government ac-
counting agency, has been more concerned with its complete lack
of success in making its reversal of a decision favorable to the
contractor stick in court. Proof of fraud or gross mistake against
the Government on the part of the Government's own agent
under a contract dictated by the Government is a difficult burden
to sustain.53 The GAO has taken the position that the Wunderlich
decision, by requiring proof of actual fraud, makes it virtually
impossible for the Office to fulfill its statutory duty of auditing
and settling Government accounts.54 By S. 24, the McCarran Bill,
which would give the GAO broad power to upset final administra-
tive determinations and which is substantially the bill proposed
5042 STAT. 24 (1921), 31 U.S.C. § 71 (1946). See Cable, The General Account-
ing Office and Finality of Decisions of Government Contracting Officers, 27 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 78o, 783-85 (1952) ; see also note ioo infra.
5' The Supreme Court has insisted that before filing suit an aggrieved contractor
exhaust his administrative remedy before the department head or the appropriate
board of appeals where the contract so provides. United States v. Holpuch Co.,
328 U.S. 234, 239 (1946) ; United States v. Blair, 321 U.S. 730, 735 (1944); United
States v. Callahan-Walker Construction Co., 317 U.S. 56, 61 (1942).
2 See, e.g., Albina Marine Iron Works v. United States, 79 Ct. CI. 714, 720
(1934) ; see also James Graham Mfg. Co. v. United States, 91 F. Supp. 7i5 (N.D.
Cal. i95o) (motion for summary judgment against the Government granted).
" See United States v. Mason & Hanger Co., 260 U.S. 323 (1922), holding that
the Comptroller General was without power to deduct from monies due the con-
tractor the amount of premium on a bond under a cost-plus contract where the
contracting officer had approved reimbursement as a legitimate cost. For a collec-
tion of the cases since 1922, see Braucher, Arbitration Under Government Contracts,
17 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 473, 489 n.zi6 (1952).
" Letter from Lindsay C. Warren, Comptroller General, Hearings, supra note
32, at S. The Wunderlich fraud test was applied against the Comptroller General
in Leeds & Northrup Co. v. United States, ioi F. Supp. 999 (E.D. Pa. i951).
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by Comptroller General Lindsay Warren, it frankly seeks a re-
versal of this situation.5 5
From the point of view of the contractor the administrative
review procedure of the GAO is not too dissimilar from depart-
mental review. If anything, it is more informal. The statutes under
which the GAO is authorized to settle and adjust claims by and
against the United States prescribe no definite form of procedure
for the presentation and settlement of claims, leaving it entirely
to the Comptroller General. Moreover, as an arm of Congress the
GAO would appear to be excluded from the requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act, under Section 2 (a) .56 On the other
hand, there may be some advantage to arguing a case to account-
ants, rather than lawyers, where the issue is cost accounting;
there may also be psychological satisfaction in dealing with an
office closer to the source of payment. And, of course, if the
amount is worth fighting about, it is nice to have a second chance
before resort to the courts.
III. THE WUNDERLICH DECISION AND REPERCUSSIONS
Wunderlich involved a dispute between a large contractor and
a contracting officer of the Bureau of Reclamation in the Depart-
ment of the Interior over the proper charges for the use of the
contractor's excavation equipment in the construction of the two-
million-dollar Vellecito Dam in southern Colorado. 7 The differ-
ence in the computations was the sizable sum of $ioo,ooo.
Under Article 15, the fact disputes clause in the Government's
standard construction contract, the officer's decision was final,
subject only to a written appeal within 30 days to the "head of
the Department or his duly authorized representative." Unlike
the Defense Department's ASBCA review, in the Interior De-
partment this means review by the Secretary himself, who, in
" S. 24 was passed by the Senate June 8, 1953. See 99 Cong. Rec. 4729-30,
(May 6, 1953) ; id. at 6402, 64o6 (June 3, 1953). See SEN. REP. No. 32, 83 d Cong.,
ist Sess. (1953). H.R. 1839, the companion bill, was not reported out of committee.
The original bill, identical with S. 24, was S. 2487, passed by the Senate July 3,
1952, 98 CoN. REC. 9059 (1952). See also 98 CONG. REc. 365, 6493 (1952). See
SEx. REP. No. 1670, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952) ; Hearings, supra note 32.
6 Section 2(a) provides: "Agency means each authority (whether or not
within or subject to review by another agency) of the Government of the United
States other than Congress .... " 6o STAT. 237 (1946), as amended, 5 U.S.C.
§ 00I (Supp. 1952).
" The facts are fully set out in 117 Ct. Cl. 92 (i9o).
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the Wunderlich case, fully approved the officer's decision without
a hearing.
58
The Supreme Court's decision to limit judicial review to the
issue of fraud created considerable stir in business and legal circles.
Editorials and news comments dinned on congressional ears with-
out regard to party or section.5 9 Four remedial bills were intro-
duced in the House, two in the Senate.?' Hearings were held on
the McCarran Bill before a subcommittee of the Senate Commit-
tee on the Judiciary in February and March 1952.61 The testi-
mony had an odd twist. As expected, representatives of the
private contractors and the construction trade associations 12 as-
sailed the decision in the strongest terms, borrowing some of Mr.
Justice Douglas' trenchant dissenting language. But the' Gov-
ernment departments involved, with the exception of the Depart-
ment of Justice, which had won the case, did not enter the ex-
pected defense of the status quo. In fact, the Department of
Defense admitted the reasonableness of the contractors' argument
and promised to return the disputes clause to its pre-Wunderlich
meaning by administrative amendment. In this the General
Services Administration, second only to Defense in volume of
Government contracting, concurred.63 While failing to enact any
" See note 43 supra.
" See, e.g., Engineering News Record, Dec. 6, 1951, p. 25. Senator McCarran
inserted a law review article highly critical of the W-underlich decision in the
Congressional Record. 98 CoNr. REC. 9307 (1952).
'
0 H.R. 63o, 6338, 6214, 6404; S. 2432, 2487, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
S. 2487 is the first McCarran Bill.
61 Hearings, supra note 32.
"
2 E.g., Associated General Contractors, National Association of River and
Harbor Contractors. Several general associations also filed anti-Wunderlich letters
with the committee. E.g., United States Chamber of Commerce, American Institute
of Architects.
" The Defense Department revision, made effective by ASPR Revision No. 4,
Sept. x5, X952, ASPR § 7-103.12, 2 CCH Gov'T CoNtRActs REP. ff 29,363 (1953),
applies to both supply and construction contracts. The General Services Adminis-
tration revision applies only to construction contracts. GSA Reg. No. 13, effective
June 19, 1953, 2 CCH Gov'T CONTRAcTs REP. ff 24,965 (1953). For the GSA
current, old-style disputes clause used in supply contracts, see art. 22 of General
Provision of FS Schedule, i CCH Gov'T CONTRACrS REP. 11 8,8x6 (GSA Form 281C,
March I95i). The present disputes clause for Defense Department contracts reads
as follows:
Except as otherwise provided in this contract, any dispute concerning a question
of fact arising under this contract which is not disposed of by agreement shall be
decided by the Contracting Officer, who shall reduce his decision to writing and
mail or otherwise furnish a copy thereof to the Contractor. Within 30 days from
the date of receipt of such copy, the Contractor may appeal by mailing or otherwise
furnishing to the Contracting Officer a written appeal addressed to the Secretary, and
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of the proposed remedial bills, Congress took direct action and
broadened judicial review of Defense Department disputes clauses,
tacking on a rider to the Defense Department Appropriation
Act.64 Finally Wunderlich has spurred many private groups, in-
cluding the American Bar Association, to become interested in
this important business and legal aspect of our vast procurement
program.65
A. Enlarging the Scope of Review
The proposed legislative and administrative changes were con-
cerned primarily with increasing the scope of review of the con-
tracting officer's decision or at least with stabilizing it on a pre-
Wunderlich basis. Actually, the only concrete legislative result of
Wunderlich to date has been the rider tacked on to the Department
of Defense Appropriation Acts of 1953 and 1954, which reads:
§ 635. No funds contained in this Act shall be used for the purpose of
entering into contracts containing Article 15 of the Standard Government
Contract until and unless said article is revised and amended to provide
an appeal by the contractor to the Court of Claims within ninety days of
the date of decision by the Department concerned, authority for which
appeal is hereby granted.66
The Defense Department made no attempt to interpret the con-
gressional mind but simply added to the disputes clause in its
the decision of the Secretary or his duly authorized representative for the hearing
of such appeals shall unless determined by a court of competent jurisdiction to
have been fraudulent, arbitrary, capricious, or so grossly erroneous as necessarily
to imply bad faith, be final and conclusive. In connection with any appeal pro-
ceeding under this clause, the Contractor shall be afforded an opportunity to be
heard and to offer evidence in support of its appeal. Pending final decision of a
dispute hereunder, the Contractor shall proceed diligently with the performance of
the contract and in accordance with the Contracting Officer's decision.
The clause may be modified to provide for intermediate appeal to the head of
the procuring activity concerned. Contracts involving funds appropriated in the
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1953, 66 STAr. 537 (1952), also contain
the following sentence at the end of the disputes clause: "Notwithstanding the
provisions of this clause, the Contractor shall have such right of appeal to the
Court of Claims as is provided by Section 635, Public Law 488, 82d Cong."
64 66 STAT. 537 (1952); reenacted as Pub. L. No. 179, 83d Cong., ist Sess. § 635
(Aug. z, 1953).
'5 "The volume of [Government] contracts is staggering. For the fiscal year
1953 an aggregate of $38 billion for procurement requirements have been requested
of Congress. During fiscal i951, the Ordnance Corps of the Army alone executed
some 57,000 separate contracts for amounts in excess of $5,ooo apiece." Cook, Fore-
word to Symposium on Procurement Procedures of the Federal Government, 12
FED. BJ. 231 (1952).
06 See note 64 supra.
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construction contracts which will be paid from funds appropriated
in the 1953 Act that "the contractor shall have such right of appeal
to the Court of Claims as is provided by Section 635 .. . ." "
The rider was applied to construction contracts, and not to supply
contracts, on advice of the GAO and presumably on the theory
that article 15 is the number of the standard disputes clause only
in construction contracts.68
In its original form this rider would have flatly prohibited the
use of the standard disputes clause in defense contracts. 9 As
watered down and enacted, it leaves many questions unanswered.
Inasmuch as a contractor could always appeal to the Court of
Claims, albeit not always successfully, it may not add anything
to the court's power of review. On the other hand, if it is to be
given some meaning under the usual canons of construction, it may
mean that the Court of Claims is no longer bound by Wunderlich
and pre-Wunderlich formulae in defense contract disputes and
can in effect treat the question de novo. This is supported by
reasoning that the only cause for limiting review of the contract-
ing officer's decision to fraud issues is that the parties expressly
agree that his decision will be final. Thus where the contract
itself provides for administrative appeal, the administrative re-
view is de novo. Similarly where the contract, even though under
statutory compulsion, provides for appeal to the courts, there
does not seem to be any reason for limiting that review to fraud.
To permit de novo review by the courts would, however, remove
much of the efficacy of the disputes clause. It may be that Con-
gress intended this result on the theory that the expense of litiga-
tion and the limited chance of success would mean that in most
cases the contracting officer's decision would stand.
The GAO ruling that the Section 635 requirement is limited to
67 ASPR Revision No. 4, Sept. IS, 1952, supra note 63.
6 Comptroller General's Decision No. B-112635 (1952), 2 CCH Gov'T CoN-
TRACTs REP. 614o5 (1952).
69H.R. RBE. No. i685, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952), accompanying the X953
Defense Department Appropriation Bill which passed the House, incorporated the
original § 635, which read in part: "No funds contained in this Act shall be used
for the purpose of entering into contracts containing Article IS of the Standard
Government Contract which reads as follows: . . . ." SEN. REP. No. i86i, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18 (i952), suggested the amendment of H.R. 7391 by deleting all
of § 635 (miscited as § 636). H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 2483, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1952), reported the conferees in disagreement. The House receded from its
position and concurred with the revised § 635 given in the text. 98 CoNG. REc.
9433 (1952). The Senate agreed without discussion. 98 CoNG. REc. 9511 (1952).
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construction contracts would greatly reduce the area in which its
interpretation is important. The question remains, however,
whether the GAO has correctly interpreted the congresssional
enactment. Was the reference to article 15 a deliberate effort to
limit the effect of the amendment or was it merely a slip of the
pen? Neither committee nor congressional debates suggest what
the true intention of Congress was.7° The urgency of these ques-
tions is perhaps lessened by the fact that the Defense Depart-
ment voluntarily amended its standard disputes clause to read
"final and conclusive . . . unless determined by a court of com-
petent jurisdiction to have been fraudulent, arbitrary, capricious,
or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith." The
General Services Administration has taken a similar step although
it has limited its change to construction contracts.71
This administrative action, confined to two departments, has
not halted the legislative process. Wunderlich, with Moorman in
a supporting role, is directly responsible for S. 24, the McCarran
Bill, which has passed the Senate in each of the last two sessions
of Congress and awaits consideration by the House when Congress
reconvenes in January. The Bill reads:
§ i. That no provision of any contract entered into by the United States,
relating to the finality or conclusiveness, in a dispute involving a question
arising under such contract, or any decision of an adminstrative official,
representative, or board, shall be pleaded as limiting judicial review of
any such decision to cases in which fraud by such official representative,
or board is alleged, and any such provision shall be void with respect to
any such decision which the General Accounting Office or a court, having
jurisdiction, finds fraudulent, grossly erroneous, so mistaken as neces-
sarily to imply bad faith, or not supported by reliable, probative, and
substantial evidence.
§ 2. No Government contract shall contain a provision making final on
a question of law the decision of an administrative official, representative,
or board.72
This Bill, as reported out, was broadened in favor of the anti-
Wunderlick and anti-Moorman interests and goes far beyond the
70 See note 69 supra. Other questions suggested by the language of the rider
are its effect on the six-year statute of limitations on contract claims and the
availability of review in the district courts where the claim is for less than $o,ooo.
71 See note 63 supra.
" S. 24, 83d Cong., ist Sess. (1953), as read on the floor of the Senate after
amendment, Feb. 4, 1953. See note 55 supra.
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Defense Department's voluntary change designed to return judi-
cial review to its pre-Wunderlictz form. In addition to in-
corporating the simple "gross error" test which the Supreme
Court has repeatedly rejected since the Kihlberg case, the Mc-
Carran Bill would upset any administrative decision "which the
General Accounting Office or a court, having jurisdiction, finds
. . .not supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evi-
dence." The last phrase was an amendment to the original Mc-
Carran Bill and was sponsored by several witnesses at the Senate
hearing."3 One of the six bills introduced in the 82d Congress
incorporated a similar test.7 4  Unlike the Associated General
Contractors, which had proposed a complete review de novo in
the Court of Claims,"5 the sponsors of the altered wording appear
to have had in mind the well-known "substantial evidence" rule."6
Review of an agency decision under the "substantial evidence"
rule has been compared in scope with the review of a jury verdict.
This traditionally is narrower than review of a trial judge's find-
ings, which must be "clearly erroneous" to be reversed." Ordi-
narily agency review presupposes a record made after a full-dress
hearing, which can be scrutinized by the appellate court to de-
termine whether there is substantial evidence on the whole record
to support the agency's determination. 8 In Government contract
disputes, the informality of the contracting officer's decision-
making and of the contract board's appeal procedure, in par-
ticular outside the Defense Department, leaves considerable
doubt whether there exists a record amenable to "substantial
7' Hearings, supra note 32, at 53-54 (McGuire), 54-59 (Kline).
74 H.R. 6338, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
17 Testimony of Gaskins, Hearings, supra note 32, at 33. Gaskins, agreeing with
the AGC position, cited as precedent the Tax Court's jurisdiction over renegotiation
cases. See Braucher, The Renegotiation Act of i95i, 66 HARv. L. REv. 270, 305-07
(1952).
76 See DAVIS, ADINISTRAIVE LAW § 254 (1951). Actually, the phraseology is
identical with § 7(c) of the APA: "no sanction shall be imposed or rule or order
be issued except upon consideration of the whole record or such portions thereof as
may be cited by any party 'and as supported by and in accordance with the
reliable, probative, and substantial evidence" (italics supplied), rather than the
language of the judicial review section, § io(e) (5), "unsupported by substantial
evidence," to which it is probably intended to refer.
" See DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw § 254 (195); Stern, Review of Findings of
Administrators, Judges and Juries: A Comparative Analysis, 58 HARv. L. REv. 70
(1944).
'7 See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (i95i); Jaffe, Judicial




evidence" review. This is particularly true where the record does
not include evidence adduced at a hearing where both parties
are represented. In such a case the courts might feel obligated to
go beyond the incomplete record and in effect review de novo in
order to determine whether there is substantial evidence, given
all the relevant facts, to support the conclusion of the contracting
officer. If they did not do so, "substantial evidence" would take
on a new and dubious meaning, simply that the evidence relied on
by the contracting officer could reasonably lead to his conclusion,
as opposed to the usual qualitative-quantitative determination of
whether the evidence relied on, when weighed against all the other
evidence introduced by both parties, is reasonably adequate to
support the decision."9
But the lack of a record is not the only difficulty. The forum
to which the contract appeal is taken is not an appellate court.
The Court of Claims (and the district courts in so far as they
act concurrently) is much like any other trial court though using
the commissioner system in lieu of the jury. This means that,
while it may grant money judgments against the United States
along with limited equitable relief, aside from its appellate powers
under the Indian Claims Commission Act So and the Federal Tort
Claims Act,8 it has no jurisdiction to correct errors in a record
by process of remand."2 It is true that it may consider the record
of the contracting officer and of the board of contract appeals but
only as a part of the total record, on which the commissioner and
the court, in turn, make independent findings of fact and con-
'9 See Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229-31 (1938) ; Stason,
"Substantial Evidence" in Administrative Law, 89 U. OF PA. L. Rav. io26, io36-39
(i941); DAVIS, ADmnmTNATvE LAW § 254 (1951).
o 6o STAT. 1054, 25 U.S.C. § 7o(s) (1946).
SI 6o STAT. 842 (1946), as amended (codified in scattered sections of Title 28 of
the United States Code). Review by the Court of Claims instead of a court of
appeals is obtainable upon written consent of all appellees to the district court
judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 1504 (Supp. 1952).
"2 See United States v. Jones, 336 U.S. 641, 67o (i949), where the Court advanced
as the major reason for a restrictive view of the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims
the inability of that court to render any judgment other than one for the payment
of money. Thus, in considering an order of the ICC, the Court of Claims, if it
found the order invalid, had no alternative but to proceed to a final decision of
its own. Nor should Pub. L. No. 158, 83 d Cong., ist Sess. (July 28, 1953), making
the Court of Claims a constitutional, rather than a legislative court, and negating
Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (i933), affect the specific powers of the




clusions of law. It is in no way comparable to a circuit court
reviewing an agency decision "on the whole record." While Con-
gress could give the Court of Claims appellate jurisdiction over
contract disputes, the grant of such powers should be made ex-
plicit and not left as an implication from the use of the phrase
"substantial evidence."
The Department of Justice has opposed the application of any-
thing broader than the fraud test to Government contract disputes,
anticipating that it "would constitute an open invitation to a
flood of litigation" 83 on disputed issues of fact now foreclosed
by the disputes clause. Proponents of this view suggest that the
relaxation of the fraud rule would serve only to "clog the calendar
of the Court of Claims" and give the contractor an additional
review which he has not bargained for. 4 Nevertheless, the knife
may cut both ways. If the courts' applying the McCarran Bill's
"substantial evidence" test limits review to the sufficiency of the
evidence relied on by the administrative tribunal, the contractor
going to the Court of Claims bound by the record of a board of
contract appeals may be at a serious disadvantage. In the end he
may be worse off than he would be if the board's decision were
reviewed under the Defense Department's liberalized fact dis-
putes clause for being "fraudulent, arbitrary, capricious, or so
grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith."
At its September 1952 meeting the American Bar Association's
House of Delegates took a somewhat different approach to the
problem, unanimously adopting a resolution submitted by its
Section on Administrative Law: "Be it resolved that it is the
opinion of the American Bar Association that the determination
of federal contracting officers and reviewing officials under the
finality clause of government contracts should be subject to judi-
cial review, in accordance with the criteria of the Administrative
Procedure Act, and that the Section on Administrative Law be
authorized and directed to advance appropriate legislation to that
end." 85
In August 1953, the ABA's Section on Administrative Law
authorized its Committee on the Finality Clause to sponsor as a
substitute for S. 24 at the second session of the 83 d Congress,
meeting next January, the following proposal: "Notwithstanding
83 Testimony of Phillips, Hearings, supra note 32, at 16.
4 Id. at i6-i8.
" 77 A.B.A. REP. 13o (1952).
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the presence in any contract entered into by the United States of
a provision relating to the finality or conclusiveness of any deci-
sion of an agency official, board or other representative on ques-
tions of law or fact arising under such contract, judicial review
as provided in Section io of the Administrative Procedure Act
may be had of any such decision by the contractor." 86
On first impression it would appear that the ABA resolution,
as implemented by the above bill, avoids all the difficulties of the
McCarran Bill save one, namely, the "substantial evidence" test,
as incorporated in APA Section io(e) (5). On closer scrutiny,
it becomes apparent that it poses certain questions arising out of
the intricacies of Section io itself.
As might be expected, the protracted legislative history of the
APA throws no light on whether the legislators in 1946 intended
to bring adjudication of Government contract disputes within the
Act." To determine the applicability of Section io thus requires
direct study beginning with the exceptive clause: "Except
so far as (i) statutes preclude judicial review or (2) agency
'6 Letter from David Reich, vice-chairman of the Committee, August 31, 1953.
The House Committee on the Judiciary is scheduled to take up H.R. x839, the
companion bill to S. 24, in the second session of the 83d Congress. A one-day hear-
ing was held during the last days of the first session. A bill similar in purpose but
different in approach to the ABA proposal was one of the six introduced in the
second session of the 82d Congress. H.R. 64o6 provided for the amendment of
§ io of the APA to read:
Except so far as (x) statutes preclude judicial review or (2) agency action is by
law committed to agency discretion -
(a) Right of review.-
(i) Any person suffering legal wrong because of any agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by such action within the meaning of any relevant
statute, shall be entitled to judicial review thereof.
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 2 (a) (4) hereof and the
two exceptions in the first paragraph of section io hereof, any person who shall
hereafter suffer or be threatened with any actual injury or loss as the result of
agency action in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short
of statutory right, or as the result of arbitrary and capricious agency action
amounting to an abuse of discretion, whether or not such injury or loss has hereto-
fore conferred upon such person standing to sue, shall be entitled to judicial review
thereof.
Recently, Congress has made wage determinhations under the Walsh-Healey Act
(originally exempt from rule-making under APA § 4 as a matter relating to public
contracts) subject to review under § io of the APA. Defense Production Act
Amendments of 1952, 66 STAT. 308, 41 U.S.C.A. § 43(a) (Supp. 1953). Several bills
were introduced at the first session of the 83d Congress designed to repeal this
amendment.
17 See SEN. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946). Public contracts and
other proprietary matter were exempted from APA § 4 on rule-making "be-
cause in those cases the Government is in the position of an individual citizen
concerned with its own property, funds and contracts." Id. at 358.
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action is by law committed to agency discretion -(a) Any
person suffering legal wrong because of any agency action,
or adversely affected or aggrieved by such action within the
meaning of any relevant statute, shall be entitled to judicial re-
view thereof." 88 Clearly, no statute presently precludes review
of administrative determinations of contract disputes. The real
question is whether contract dispute settlement is "agency
action . . . by law committed to agency discretion." In as much
as the Defense Department's fact disputes clause is a regulation
implementing the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947,89 it
is arguable that Congress by law has delegated final action on
contract disputes to the procurement agency's discretion. On the
other hand, even if this were true, the Defense Department's
recent amendment to its disputes clause clearly envisages court
review of the agency's discretion on specific grounds." Certainly,
if Congress should pass the ABA proposal, it does not seem likely
that Section io of the APA under which the proposal makes re-
view available would be interpreted so as not to apply at all to
the very situation which Congress intended to bring under its
coverage.
Assuming that judicial review of Government contract disputes
is not excluded under Section io, the next question is whether
the remaining subsections, (b) through (e), are applicable. No
difficulty arises until one examines the criteria in Section io(e)
on scope of review. Clearly, under our previous analysis, the
"substantial evidence" rule is a misfit as applied to the decisions
of boards of contract appeals. 1 But it is evident that by its own
definition, Section io (e) (5) is not intended to apply, for it reads:
"the reviewing court shall . . . (B) hold unlawful and set aside
agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be ... (5) un-
supported by substantial evidence in any case subject to the
requirements of sections 7 and 8 or otherwise reviewed on the
record of an agency hearing provided by statute . . . ." In as
much as the ABA Bill is restricted to Section io, and does not
8 6o STAT. 243, 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1946).
s 62 STAT. 21 (1948), 41 U.S.C. §§ isi et seq. (Supp. 1952). The same can be
said for the GSA disputes clause under the Federal Property and Administrative
Services Act of 1949, 63 STAT. 393 (1949), 41 U.S.C. § 251 (Supp. 1952).
90 "Cunless determined by a court of competent jurisdiction to have been fraud-
ulent, arbitrary, capricious, or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad
faith. . . ." See note 63 supra.
"1 See pp. 237-39 supra.
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refer to Sections 7 and 8, which apply only to hearings required
by statute, and since no statute requires a board of contracts
appeal hearing, it would appear that the "substantial evidence"
rule should not be invoked by a court reviewing a "decision of an
agency official, board or other representative on questions of law
or fact arising under such contract."
Under Section io(e), agency action can also be set aside if it is
"(i) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law," and it is presumably this phrase on
which contractors would rely most. 2 If this is so, it may be
wondered whether Section io would add anything to the adminis-
trative amendment the Defense Department and General Services
Administration have made to their disputes clauses, which in-
cludes similar language. 93 To be sure, it would have an impact
on other procurement agencies, such as the Interior Department,
which have not as yet amended their disputes clauses, and it would
serve as a guarantee to contractors against subsequent adminis-
trative reversal of policy.91
B. New Authority in the GAO: Auditor or Court?
Proposed changes in the disputes clause set-up have not been
limited to expansion of the scope of court review. During the
Senate hearings on the finality clause legislation, the Comptroller
92 "(2) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (3) in
excess of statutory jurisdiction authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right;
(4) without observance of procedure required by law .... ." are presumably not
relevant standards because administrative decisions under the disputes clause are not
governed by constitutional, statutory, or common law provisions. "1(6) unwarranted
by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing
court . .. ." is inapplicable because the facts presented to the administrative board
are by contract not subject to de novo trial. In fact, under the Kihlberg rule the
court could examine the facts only for the purpose of discovering "fraud or such
gross mistake as would necessarily imply bad faith, or failure to exercise an honest
judgment." Wunderlich's excision of all this formula but fraud underscores the
non-de-novo nature of the court review. An example of a situation where judicial
review consists of a trial de novo is reparation orders under the Interstate Com-
merce Act and the Packers and Stockyards Act which by statute are given only
prima facie weight. See ArTT'Y GEN. MANUAL ON THE APA iog--Io (1947).
9' "fraudulent, arbitrary, capricious, or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to
imply bad faith . . . 2" See note 63 .supra.9 4 Finally, it should be noted that the ABA bill apparently provides for direct
review of a contracting officer's decision without exhaustion of the administrative
remedy before the appropriate board of contract appeals. See p. 240 supra. This
would seem to have been an unintentional oversight in drafting.
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General persuaded the subcommittee to modify the original Mc-
Carran Bill to give the GAO broader power to upset final ad-
ministrative determinations beyond Wunderlich's narrow "fraud
and fraud alone" exception, and to prohibit the all disputes type
of clause which had been approved by Moorman.5 The pending
bill is thus, in effect, a GAO bill. If enacted, it would invest the
GAO with the power - which it has never had - to upset an
administrative decision which it finds "grossly erroneous" or "not
supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence."
It is not clear whether the Bill would make a GAO reversal of
the contracting officer bind the courts or whether it merely
permits a broader scope of review subject, as in the past, to a
judicial determination of whether the GAO decision was correct.96
The Bill says the finality provision is void if the GAO or a court
having jurisdiction finds the contracting officer's decision is not
supported by substantial evidence. Read literally it would in-
dicate that the GAO was an alternative review tribunal open to
both the contractor and the Government and with the power of
final decision. If this reading is correct, by placing the GAO on
a par with the courts and allowing it to overturn a contracting
officer's decision not supported by substantial evidence the Mc-
Carran Bill would put the contractor in a very uncertain financial
position. Although it would provide the contractor with an al-
ternative review of decisions favorable to the Government, the
GAO is more concerned with scrutinizing decisions favorable to
the contractor. In its capacity as overseer of Government dis-
bursements the GAO is inevitably cost conscious in its view of
contract disputes. Such an outlook, while necessary in an auditor,
is hardly the sole guide to successful operation of a business or to
impartial adjudication of disputes where other factors - such
as the maintenance of a favorable business attitude, the necessity
9 5 Yates, Assistant Comptroller General, testifying, Hearings, supra note 32, at
4-X3.
96 But note the statement in the Senate subcommittee's report on S. 24, SM.
REP. No 32, 83d Cong., ist Sess. (1953):
The committee wishes to point out with respect to the language contained in
the bill, "in the General Accounting Office or a court, having jurisdiction," that it is
not intended to narrow or restrict or change in any way the present jurisdiction of
the General Accounting Office, either in the course of a settlement or upon audit;
that the language in question is not intended either to change the jurisdiction of the
General Accounting Office or to grant any new jurisdiction, but simply to recognize
the jurisdiction which the General Accounting Office already has.
It is impossible to reconcile the Bill's language with this disclaimer. In any contest
the language of the Bill would presumably prevail.
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of getting a job done, and protection of the private contractor -
may be equally important considerations." On its own motion
after investigation or at the instigation of some executive depart-
ment the GAO could deny payment or demand payment back
after a considerable lapse of time without the possibility of court
review. The statute does not disclose how the GAO would enforce
its demand for payment back. Presumably there would have to
be court action to force compliance with the administrative
order.98 The net result could be little finality to the Government's
word on the countless matters embraced under the disputes clause.
Contractors might be placed in the position of being unable to
close their books until the three-year statute of limitations on the
GAO's investigative activities had run." Surety companies writ-
ing performance and payment bonds and banks financing long-
term contracts might have to look to their security.'00
It may be that the McCarran Bill is not intended to disturb
the subordinate position of the GAO but merely broadens its
"' The declaration of policy of the Contract Settlement Act of 1944, 58 STAT.
649 (1944), 41 U.S.C. § 101 (1946), noted the subordinate importance of the audit-
ing function in Government business, declaring one objective of the statute to be "to
use all practicable methods compatible with the foregoing objectives [which included
maximum production during war, expeditious reconversion, assurance to contractors
of speedy and equitable final settlement of claims, and adequate interim financing
until such settlement] to prevent improper payments and to detect and prosecute
fraud" (emphasis supplied).
1 See, e.g., the Civil Aeronautics Act, 52 STAT. 1025 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 647
(a), (b) (1946), which permits a party in interest or the CAB to apply to the
district court for the enforcement of CAB rules and orders. Enforcement of ad-
ministrative orders invariably raises the question of how conclusive the adminis-
trative order is and whether the court review should be merely perfunctory. For
a general discussion, see DAvIs, ADmINiSTRATIVE LAw § 220 (1951).
"a Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947, as amended, 65 STAT. 700 (1951), 41
U.S.C. § I53(c) (Supp. 1952):
All contracts negotiated without advertising pursuant to authority contained in
this chapter shall include a clause to the effect that the Comptroller General of the
United States or any of his duly authorized representatives shall until the expiration
of three years after final payment have access to and the right to examine any
directly pertinent books, documents, papers, and records of the contractor or any of
his subcontractors engaged in the performance of and involving transactions related
to such contracts or subcontracts.
See 2 CCH Gov'T CoNTRACTs RFP. 11 24,858, § 209.03 (a) (1952). The same provision
appears in the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as
amended, 63 STAT. 395 (I949), 41 U.S.C. § 254(c) (Supp. 1952).
100 See letter from 0. P. Easterwood, Jr., Hearings, supra note 32, at Iig-2:
It is suggested that the surety companies who write the performance and payment
bonds and the banks who finance the contractor would be very loath to bond or lend
money to contractors where the possibility or probability existed that the Comp-
troller might differ with an administrative decision of a contracting officer made in
favor of a contractor and could later collect back the difference between their sub-
stituted judgment and that of a contracting officer from a contractor.
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scope of review. If so, the contractor could still find a favorable
contracting officer's decision reversed in court on substantial
evidence grounds since the GAO may request the Attorney Gen-
eral to enforce its decision in the district court.1°1
In any event, as the Bill now stands, the effect of the GAO deci-
sion on subsequent judicial action needs clarification if its effect
on the contractor is to be understood. Moreover, regardless of the
intended position of the GAO in the judicial hierarchy, it may be
undesirable to cause a weakening of the contractor's position by
permitting a continuing review of the facts by the Government
under the "substantial evidence" rule. The contractor's need for
financial certainty seems much greater than that of the Govern-
ment.
C. Fate of the All Disputes Clause
Section 2 of the McCarran Bill, prohibiting any provision in a
Government contract "making final on a question of law the
decision of an administrative official, representative, or board,"
presents another problem. Sponsored mainly by the GAO, this
section is aimed at the 1950 Moorman case where the Supreme
Court finally convinced the Court of Claims that the all
disputes clause was valid. It is difficult to forecast the exact
impact of this proposed prohibition. While the Navy Department
uses an all disputes clause in all of its cost-plus-fixed-fee con-
tracts, the Department of the Army since World War II has been
relying principally on the fact disputes clause in both its supply
and construction contracts. 2 Nowhere in the hearings on the
proposed legislation is there any indication that the procurement
101 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (Supp. 1952). The recovery of debts due the United
States was originally entrusted to the GAO, 28 STAT. 206 (1894), as amended, 31
U.S.C. § 93 (1946), but this function was transferred to the Department of Justice
in 1933. Exec. Order No. 6166 (June io, 1933), following 5 U.S.C. § 132 (1946).
The Government may obtain a judgment in the Court of Claims on the amount
determined to be due from the contractor but only where the contractor has
applied to the proper department of the Government for settlement of his account.
Pub. L. No. 158, 83d Cong., ist Sess. § 9 (July 28, 1953). Presumably this will
not be the case where the contracting officer's decision favors the contractor.
102 Kennedy, The Conclusiveness of Administrative Findings in Disputes Arising
Under Government Contracts, 4 BAYLOR L. REV. i6o, 161-62 (1952). See Puget
Sound Bridge & Dredging Co. v. United States, io7 F. Supp. 749 (Ct. Cl. 1952) (all
disputes clause in Navy shipbuilding contract). Prior to the Moorman case, the
Department of the Army made wide use of the "Claims, Protests and Appeals"
article (in effect an all disputes clause) in its construction contract specifications.
Kennedy, supra, at 16i.
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agencies would strenuously object to the elimination of the all
disputes clause.
For centuries the problem of whether a question is of law or
fact has plagued common law judges. The Attorney General's
Committee on Administrative Procedure took a dim view: "In
numerous decisions courts have held that specific issues involved
were questions of fact or questions of law. But definite criteria
for ascertaining confidently which is which prior to court decision
have not yet developed . . . .What one judge regards as a ques-
tion of fact another thinks is a question of law." 103
Apart from Justice Black's dictum in Moorman,"°4 the one recent
case where the Court has seriously considered the law-fact dis-
tinction is United States v. Callahan-Walker Construction Co.105
There the Court, applying the facts disputes clause to an equitable
adjustment under the contract, unanimously reversed the Court
of Claims, holding that an "equitable adjustment" of the con-
tractor's additional payment for extra work involved merely the
ascertainment of the cost of digging, moving, and placing earth,
and the addition to that cost of "a reasonable and customary al-
lowance for profit," and these were "inquiries of fact" for which
article 15 provided the only avenue for relief. Signs like Calla-
han-Walker point toward Supreme Court liberalization of the
"facts" in the fact disputes clause - a tendency which the
procurement agencies may feel obliged to encourage if Section 2
of the McCarran Bill is adopted.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
It is perhaps a little late to ask whether a Government contract
is something other than a contract. There is some evidence that
it is but a convenient administrative device for the Government
to get its procurement work done and that administrative de-
103 REP. AnI9Y GEN. Comm. AD. PROC. 88, 9o (1941). See also Paul, Dobson
v. Commissioner: The Strange Ways of Law and Fact, 57 HANv. L. REv. 753
(1944). The law-fact distinctions in Government contract cases are no exception.
Compare Davis v. United States, 82 Ct. C1. 334 (1936), with United States v.
Lundstrom, 139 F.2d 792, 795 (9th Cir. 1943), and Blair v. United States, 164 F.2d
I5, 1z6 (5th Cir. 1947). See Notes, 37 CORNE ; L.Q. 493, 499 (1952), x37 A.L.R.
530 (1942).
'04 "The oft-repeated conclusion of the Court of Claims that questions of
'interpretation' are not questions of fact is ample reason why the parties to the
contract should provide for final determination of such disputes by a method wholly
separate from the fact-limited provisions of Art. 152 338 U.S. 457, 463 (195o).105 317 U.S. 56 (1942).
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cisions of the Government's officers should be treated no differ-
ently from other administrative orders which affect private in-
terests. Be that as it may, contract notions are so deeply imbedded
in the thinking of judges and businessmen that it would be revo-
lutionary for one to deny their expectation that an individual or
corporation contracting with the Government will be fully pro-
tected with traditional rights and remedies.' The basic question
is whether the present state of the law under the Wunderlich rule
fulfills these expectations, while permitting the Government to
get its contracting done efficiently, inexpensively, and expedi-
tiously.
Assuming that under the present dispensation commercial ar-
bitration is unavailable :o0 and that the Government will not sac-
rifice its disputes machinery, our problem is to create an arbiter
of contract disputes who will be both unbiased and competent.
From the standpoint of competence, the contracting officer who
is close to the day-to-day operation of a Government supply or
construction contract seems indispensable; from the standpoint of
lack of bias, a nisi prius court best fits our common law thinking.
The problem, boiled down then, is, can we create a system which
will embrace both considerations?
Clearly neither Mr. Justice Minton's "fraud and fraud alone"
10 See Grismore, Contracts with the United States, 22 MICH. L. REV. 749, 764
(1924): "It is not asking much to expect the Government to live up to those rules
and principles to which it exacts adherence from the citizen .... In a commercial
age the Government must engage in business, and if it is to do this effectively it
must of necessity obey those rules which businessmen have developed for their
governance .... " See also Maguire and Zimet, Hobson's Choice and Similar
Practices in Federal Taxation, 48 HARv. L. REv. 1281, 1299 (1935): "If we say
with Mr. justice Holmes, 'Men must turn square corners when they deal with the
Government,' it is hard to see why the government should not be held to a like
standard of rectangular rectitude when dealing with its citizens."
107 See Braucher, Arbitration Under Government Contracts, E7 LAW & CoNSMrp.
PROB. 473, 485-86, Sor (1952) (concluding that the Government would not accept
compulsory arbitration, and that experience under the Contract Settlement Act
demonstrates that discretionary arbitration would not be widely used). The cases
reveal sporadic use of arbitration. A recent example is George J. Grant Construction
Co. v. United States, io9 F. Supp. 245 (Ct. Cl. 1953), where, despite the absence of
express statutory authority, an arbitration provision similar to the AIA standard
procedure was approved. See Brief for the United States, p. 138. See also GRASKE,
LAW Or GovER mENT DEFENSE CONTRACTS §§ r57-63 (i94i); Maddren, Ad-
ininistrative and Judicial Machinery, To LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 659, 680 (i944)
(discussing H.R. 3665, designed to substitute arbitration for the disputes clause);
Note, So YALE LJ. 458 (1941). For a recent example of an ineffective arbitration
clause, see Aktiebolaget Bofors v. United States, 194 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir. ig5i).
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test nor the lately deposed "implied bad faith" test (which
together comprise the Kilberg formula) is adequate. They
are, as we have seen, a product of the horse and buggy contract
age. In the late nineteenth century the Supreme Court used the
Kihlberg formula interchangeably in Government and private
contract cases. Its justification in private contract litigation was
based on a desire not to substitute the jury for the expert who
had presumably been freely chosen by both parties, though ad-
mittedly in the employ of one. It may well be that the early
Government contracts with which the Supreme Court dealt were
as freely bargained for as were the private contracts, and the
Army engineer as independent as the private engineer, architect,
or other expert. But with the phenomenal growth of Government
contracting, the exclusive use of the standard form contract, and
the changing role of the contracting officer from expert to Gov-
ernment agent, neither of these assumptions holds true. Hence,
it is a real question whether the Kihlberg test, let alone Wunder-
lick, adequately protects the contractor from the arbitrary decision
of a contracting officer even as reviewed by his department head
or the designated appeals board.
What of the Defense Department's amendment to the disputes
clause which purports to return it to its pre-Wunderlich meaning
by conferring jurisdiction on the court limited by the test "fraud-
ulent, arbitrary, capricious, or so grossly erroneous as necessarily
to imply bad faith"? " Although the words "arbitrary" and
"capricious" go beyond the strict Kiklberg formula, they would
appear to be a fair concession to contractors, particularly in view
of the increasingly familiar APA language. While the GSA has
also liberalized its disputes clause for construction contracts, the
adequacy of such adminstrative amendment as a general solution
largely depends on whether other procurement agencies will follow
suit.
While eliminating the words of art, "arbitrary" and "capri-
cious," the McCarran Bill would add two new types of review to
the pre-Wunderlich test, namely, "gross mistake" and "substan-
tial evidence." It is now evident that the "substantial evidence"
type of review would be singularly inappropriate if applied by
the Court of Claims to an administrative board of contract ap-
... Query whether the Defense Department may "confer" jurisdiction on the
courts to review in accordance with a strict administrative formula, or whether
this is a partial ouster of jurisdiction.
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peals. While it widens the scope of judicial review, the "gross
mistake" test which the Court of Claims had sporadically, and
evidently improperly, used prior to Wunderlich, fits the disputes
problem much better. In the hands of a careful court it would
not result in the substitution of the court's judgment for the con-
tracting officer's findings.
Certainly, most alarming of the innovations proposed by the
McCarran Bill is that granting to the GAO the status of a Court
of Claims. In addition to creating possible double expense to the
Government, this innovation could undermine the security and
bankable quality of Government contracts which Congress has
sought to increase through the 194o Assignment of Claims Act 100
and in diverse ways.
While the prohibition against the all disputes clauses may seem
somewhat academic at the moment with the Defense Department,
the largest procurement agency, committed almost exclusively to
the fact disputes clause, the worst that can be said is that it may
accentuate the difficulty courts have in drawing the line between
law and fact." °
The ABA proposal, if amended to take care of the difficulties
pointed out in the discussion above, seems to be a far more satis-
factory solution than the McCarran Bill. It has the additional
merit that it would apply retroactively to contracts negotiated
before the disputes clause amendment. In bringing Government
contract disputes within the APA, the proposal also serves to
point up the administrative nature of a Government contract.'
Another, and not necessarily alternative, solution would be to
improve the administrative disputes machinery. Decisions of the
contracting officer could be better articulated, without necessity
for undue formality. The hearing before the boards of other
lo 54 STAT. 1029 (1940), as amended, 31 U.S.C. § 203 (Supp. 1952).
110 Obviously § 635, the confusing rider to the Defense Department Appropria-
tion Bills of 1953 and 1954, should be eliminated before it leads to troublesome
litigation. See p. 234 supra.
... Continental law has, in the recent words of a prominent scholar, approached
the same problem by setting up a category of "administrative contracts" and "al-
locating the matter to administrative law and jurisdiction, under which the private
party may obtain injunctions or damages and is, on the whole, not much worse off
than under a private law contract . . . .The relative prevalence of public policy
or private interests must decide whether a transaction involving a public authority
is a private law contract, in which both parties are in a position of equality, or a
public law transaction, where the public authority enjoys unilateral privileges."
FRIEDmANN, LAW AND SOCIAL CnA'NG IN CoNTiPoRARY BRIrAIN 62, 64 (1951).
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procurement agencies could approximate more closely the in-
formal, yet full, hearing afforded by the ASBCA. Opinions could
be published and made available. Steps could be taken to
strengthen the independence and impartiality of the boards. 112
The result would be an administrative appeal in which the private
parties had confidence and against which charges of bias and
unfairness would not stand. Under such circumstances it would
not seem necessary to widen the Court of Claims' review beyond
the "gross mistake" test or the ABA proposal. To enable con-
tractors to take inexpensive appeals from adverse contracting
officers' decisions, the boards of Defense and GSA could travel
on circuit as does the Tax Court; and to make judicial review
more available, the present Tucker Act limitation in the district
courts could be raised from $io,ooo to at least $ioo,ooo." 3
1'2 See letter from 0. P. Easterwood, Jr., Hearings, supra note 32, at 120:
It would seem that the independence of the Board could be better established and
the impartiality carried out in great detail if the Board reported onlyto the Secre-
tary of Defense and had no particular allegiance to any of the Secretaries of the
respective services. By the same token, an independent appeal board could be re-
quired, for example, under the General Services Administration to handle contracts
administered by the Bureau of Reclamation, Civil Aeronautics Authority, etc.
11' The $ro,ooo figure was established in 1887, when the value of the dollar was
markedly greater than what it is today and the volume of Government contracting
considerably smaller. See note ii supra.
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